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INTRODUCTION
In 1988 Congress amended the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c), redefining corporate residence for venue purposes as
"any judicial district in which [the defendant] is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced."' In 1990 and
1992, Congress amended section 1391(a), the federal venue statute
for diversity of citizenship cases, to make venue proper in "a judicial
district in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction
at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which
the action may otherwise be brought. ' 2
At first glance, these provisions suggest that the only relevant
contact with the forum district is one that the defendant has at the
time the action is commenced, rather than at the time the claim ac-
crued.3 By referring specifically to the time of commencement, sec-
tion 1391 also seems to imply that the concept of personal
jurisdiction does not carry inherent notions of the timing of con-
tacts. This implication is erroneous. Contrary to the implication of
section 1391, a number of cases hold that the relevant time to deter-
mine personal jurisdiction is the time of accrual. 4 Personal jurisdic-
tion can be based either on a defendant's contacts with the forum
I Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1007,
102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1991)).
Prior to this change, corporate residence for venue purposes was defined as "any judi-
cial district in which [the corporation] is licensed to do business or is doing busi-
ness .... 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1976) amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1991).
2 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 110, 104 Stat. 5089,
5114 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3) (Supp. 1991)). The 1992
amendment added the language,"if there is no district in which the action may otherwise
be brought." Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 504,
106 Stat. 4506, 4513 (1992). No analogous provision appears in the prior version of
§ 1391(a).
3 A cause of action is "commenced" when the plaintiff files a complaint. FED. R.
Civ. P. 3. "A cause of action [or claim] 'accrues' when a suit may be maintained
thereon." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 21 (6th ed. 1990).
4 See, e.g., Snyder v. Eastern Auto Distribs., Inc., 357 F.2d 552, 556 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 987 (1966); Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carl J. Austad & Sons,
Inc., 343 F.2d 7, 11 (8th Cir. 1965); Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822, 827
(10th Cir. 1963); First Pullen Commodity Servs., Inc. v. A.G. Becker-Kipnis & Co., 507
F. Supp. 770, 774 (S.D. Fla. 1981); L'Heureux v. Central Am. Airways Flying Serv., Inc.,
209 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Md. 1962); Nelson v. Victory Elec. Works, Inc., 210 F. Supp.
954, 956 (D. Md. 1962); Annotation, Provision in 28 U.S. C. § 1391(c)for Laying Venue of an
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that are related to the claim and occurred at the time the claim ac-
crued, or on a defendant's domicile-type contacts with the forum at
the time the claim is commenced.5 There is no evidence that Con-
gress considered the timing-of-contacts issue when it amended sec-
tion 1391.6 This Note takes up that task.
The concept of personal jurisdiction, as developed by the
courts, may be divided into specific and general jurisdiction. 7 Each
of these conceptual categories is imbued with notions of the timing
of contacts. Specific jurisdiction depends on a defendant's contacts
with the forum at the time the claim arose. General jurisdiction de-
pends on the contacts that existed at the time the action is com-
menced. While the new venue statute could be read as modifying
the timing requirements of personal jurisdiction, this Note argues
that the new venue statute merely requires that personal jurisdic-
tion, whether specific or general, must continue to exist over the
defendant at the time that the specific action is commenced.
To make sense of the new statute, it is necessary to take a closer
look at the concepts of venue and personal jurisdiction. Part I of
this Note examines a variety of background issues and concepts, in-
cluding the text of the venue statutes. Part II uses a series of hypo-
thetical cases to analyze the nuances of the background concepts
and how they shape the law of venue. Finally, Part III evaluates pos-
sible interpretations of section 1391 and urges an interpretation of
the present scheme that best accommodates the text and purpose of
section 1391 in light of the existing notions of personal jurisdiction.
I
BACKGROUND
Section A sets forth the text of the statute, both as it existed
prior to 1988 and as amended. Section B addresses several back-
ground issues. Subsection 1 briefly discusses the conceptual differ-
ences between, and the overarching goals of, personal jurisdiction
and venue. Subsection 2 traces the distinction between specific and
Action Against a Corporation in District in Which it is Doing Business as Referring to Date of Filing
Suit or of Accrual of Cause of Action, 2 A.L.R. FED. 995 (1969) (Supp. 1992).
5 See discussion infra part I.B.2.
6 The same language is used in both § 1391(a)(3) and § 1391(c). In neither case
does the legislative history indicate that the timing of contacts was considered. See H.R.
REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6869 [herein-
after 1990 HOUSE REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6031 [hereinafter 1988 HOUSE REPORT]; 136 CONG. REC. S17,581
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
7 See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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general personal jurisdiction. Subsection 3 compares general juris-
diction with the "doing business"" standard of corporate residence.
A. The Venue Statutes
1. The Text of the Statutes
The law of federal venue has changed significantly in the past
three years. In terms of timing of contacts, the most significant
changes are to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), the general venue statute for
diversity cases, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which defines corporate
residence.
Prior to 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) provided for venue as
follows:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity
of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all de-
fendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
In 1990 and 1992, Congress amended § 1391(a), so that it now
reads:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity
of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in (1) a judicial district wherein any defendant re-
sides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial dis-
trict in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is
the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in
which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the
time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the
action may otherwise be brought.
Section 1391(c) defines corporate residence for venue pur-
poses. Prior to 1988, section 1391(c) read:
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and
such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such
corporation for venue purposes.
In 1988, Congress amended section 1391(c) to read:
(c) For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is
a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in
which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is
commenced. In a State which has more than one judicial district
and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to per-
8 "Doing business" refers to a definition of corporate residence contained in 28




sonaljurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corpo-
ration shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within
which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal ju-
risdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is no
such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the dis-
trict within which it has the most significant contacts.
This Note concerns only analyzing section 1391 as it appeared
prior to 1988 and as it exists today. Consequently, this Note does
not focus upon the 1988 and 1990 amendments.
2. The Changes Wrought by Amendment
a. Section 1391(a)
The 1990 and 1992 amendments brought four substantive
changes to section 1391(a). With one exception, these changes ex-
panded the plaintiff's choice of venue.
First, Congress eliminated "where all plaintiffs... reside" as a
venue option. Congress intended to narrow section 1391(a) and to
bring it into accord with section 1391 (b), which covers venue in fed-
eral question cases and includes no such provision.9
Second, the option of laying venue in a "judicial district where
. . .all defendants reside"'10 has been broadened" to the state
boundaries, by providing for venue in a judicial district where "any
defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State."' 2
Under the old wording, for venue to be proper in one district in a
multi-district state, all defendants were required to reside in that
district. Now, as long as all defendants reside in the same state, any
district in that state in which a defendant resides is a proper venue.
Third, the amendments broadened "where the claim arose" to
include places where only "a substantial part of the events or omis-
sions giving rise to the claim occurred." This makes it possible for
several districts, rather than just one, to be valid venue options
under this choice. Congress made this change to "avoid[] the litiga-
tion breeding phrase 'in which the claim arose.' 13
Finally, Congress added a new option for venue: "[A]ny judi-
cial district in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdic-
tion at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in
which the action may otherwise be brought." This addition consti-
9 136 CONG. REC. S17,581 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
10 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
11 See 136 CONG. REC. S17,581 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). This amendment also
brings § 1391 into alignment with § 1392(a), which provides: "Any civil action, not of a
local nature, against defendants residing in different districts in the same State, may be
brought in any of such districts." 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1988).
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
13 1990 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6.
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tutes a limited expansion of venue. Before Congress amended sec-
tion 1391(a) in 1992,14 this provision seemed to make venue
coextensive with the outer limits of personal jurisdiction. With the
1992 amendment, however, venue under section 1391(a) (3) is avail-
able only if there is no judicial district where venue is proper under
sections 1391(a)(1) or (a)(2).
Additionally, section 1391 (a) (3) does not contain the "most-sig-
nificant-contacts" clause found in the new section 1391(c).1 5 Be-
cause personal jurisdiction is normally determined at state
boundaries, rather than at the boundaries ofjudicial districts, venue
under section 1391(a)(3) is apparently proper in any district of a
multi-district state in which the defendant is subject to personal ju-
risdiction. Assume, for example, that there are two defendants in a
case: Dl and D2. Dl resides in the Northern District of New York,
and D2, a Montana resident, was served with process while physi-
cally present in the Western District of New York. They are being
sued on a cause of action that arose in Swaziland. Both defendants
are subject to personal jurisdiction in all of New York, making venue
proper in any judicial district in New York, including the Southern
District, where neither defendant has any contacts. However, New
York is the only state in the U.S. where venue is proper under any
provision of section 1391(a) on this claim.
b. Section 1391(c)
Before the 1988 amendments to section 1391(c), the statute
contained three definitions of corporate residence for venue pur-
poses: any place the defendant is incorporated, any place the defen-
dant is licensed to do business, and any place the defendant is doing
business. With the 1988 amendments, Congress replaced these
three options with a single standard: "[Where] it is subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." 16
In addition, the 1988 version adds a "most-significant-contacts"
provision. This clause restricts a corporation's residence in a multi-
ple-district state to the judicial district(s) in which the defendant
would be subject to personal jurisdiction if the district itself were a
14 Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 504, 106
Stat. 4506, 4513 (1992).
15 "In a State which has more than one judicial district and in which a defen-
dant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an
action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any
district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to sub-
ject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if
there is no such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the
district within which it has the most significant contacts."




separate state. If there are no such districts, then the defendant is
deemed to reside in the district in which it has the highest level of
contacts. 17
B. Background Considerations
This Section examines three pairs of concepts, that are impor-
tant to the meaning of section 1391. Subsection one examines the
distinctions between personal jurisdiction and venue. Subsection
two focuses on the two types of personal jurisdiction-specific and
general. Subsection three compares general personal jurisdiction
with "doing business," a basis of corporate residence under the pre-
1988 section 1391(c).
1. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue
The modem concept of personal jurisdiction is based on two
factors: (1) whether the forum district has power over the defendant
(commonly known as the "minimum contacts" line of inquiry); and
(2) whether it is reasonable to subject the defendant to suit in this
district (frequently referred to in terms of "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice"). 18 On the other hand, venue ad-
dresses the issue of where it would be most convenient for the parties
to litigate a particular dispute.1 9 Professor Wright has offered the
following distinction between jurisdiction and venue:
The distinction must be clearly understood between jurisdiction,
which is the power to adjudicate, and venue, which relates to the
place where judicial authority may be exercised, and which is in-
tended for the convenience of the litigants. It is possible for juris-
diction to exist though venue in a particular district is improper,
and it is possible for a suit to be brought in the appropriate venue
though it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 20
Thus, while venue is a purely statutory creation, the outer limits of
personal jurisdiction are delineated by the due process require-
ments of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 21
17 Id.
18 Both concepts can be traced to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945). See also Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 965 F.2d 1014 (11 th Cir. 1992)
petition for cert. filed (Feb. 26, 1993) (summarizing the history of the power and reasona-
bleness tests); Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and
Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (1981).
19 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 42 at 240 (4th ed.
1983).
20 Id. at 239 (footnotes omitted).
21 See generally Clermont, supra note 18.
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2. Specific and General Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction is classified as either general or specific. 22
Where a defendant has a high level of contacts with a state over an
extended period of time (as in the operation of corporate headquar-
ters), the defendant is said to be subject to general personal jurisdic-
tion. 23 Where a defendant has contacts that are closely
"affiliat[ed]" 24 with the claim (such as when it commits a tort in the
state), the defendant is said to be subject to specific personal
jurisdiction. 25
The distinction between general and specific jurisdiction may
be traced to International Shoe Co. v. Washington,26 the cornerstone of
the modern law of personal jurisdiction. In International Shoe, the
Supreme Court analyzed a state's exercise of jurisdiction according
to two factors: the level of in-state activity carried out by the defen-
dant, and the degree of relatedness between the in-state activity and
the claim filed.27 The Court analyzed four combinations of these
two factors.
The Court began by examining situations in which both factors
pointed either for or against the existence of jurisdiction. The first
scenario involved situations in which a defendant's contacts are both
"continuous and systematic" 28 and "give rise to the liabilities sued
on." 29 The Court found that jurisdiction in these cases, with high
levels of in-state activities and a high degree of relatedness between
the activities and the claim, "has never been doubted." 30 The sec-
ond scenario, involving "single or isolated"31 in-state activities "un-
connected"3 2 with the suit, argues against the existence of
jurisdiction. To allow for jurisdiction in these cases, the Court held,
22 This terminology was first proposed by Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136
(1966). See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8
(1984) [hereinafter Helicol]; Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at GeneralJurisdiction, 66
TEx. L. REV. 721 (1988); Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1444, 1444 (1988); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988); Robert L. Theriot, Note, Specific and General Jurisdiction-The
Reshuffling of Minimum Contacts Analysis, 59 TUL. L. REV. 826, 832 (1985).
23 von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 1136.
24 Id. at 1150.
25 Id. at 1144.
26 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27 Id. at 317-18.







would impose "too great and unreasonable a burden"33 on the
defendant.
Conversely, scenarios three and four present cases where activ-
ity levels and relatedness point in opposite directions. In the third
situation, the Court found that "continuous corporate operations" 3 4
alone may or may not support jurisdiction over claims unrelated to
these activities. The Court noted that jurisdiction had been found
to exist where the activities "were thought so substantial and of such
a nature as to justify suit against [the defendant] on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." 35 In
the fourth scenario, the Court found that isolated in-state acts "be-
cause of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their com-
mission .. .may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation
liable to suit."3 6 That is, exercising the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within a state "may give rise to obligations, and, so far as
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within
the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to
a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said
to be undue."37
These last two International Shoe scenarios have come to be
known as general and specific jurisdiction.3 8 One question that has
received little attention is whether general and specific jurisdiction
are distinct categories,3 9 or are merely endpoints on a continuum
that runs from the combination of high relatedness with low con-
tacts to that of low relatedness and high contacts. 40 The two subsec-
tions that follow address the arguments in favor of treating general
and specific jurisdiction (1) as endpoints of a continuum, or (2) as
distinct categories, or "pigeonholes."
The answer to the continuum/pigeonhole question depends on
whether the "arises out of" or the "connected with" test for related-
ness between the cause of action and the forum is dominant. Inter-
national Shoe set forth these two tests, without distinguishing
33 Id.
34 Id. at 318.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
38 Helicol, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14; see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22.
39 This seems to be the original conception of von Mehren & Trautman. See von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 1141-46 (describing general and specific jurisdic-
tion as substantially different concepts).
40 The continuum view is most thoroughly analyzed in William M. Richman, Part
l-Casad's Jurisdiction in Civil Actions; Part Il-A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction
Between General and SpeificJurisdiction, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1328, 1336-46 (1984) (review es-
say). See also Helicol, 466 U.S. 408, 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting); KEVIN M. CLERMONT,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 153 (2d ed. 1988); Lea Brilmayer et al., supra note 22, at 737 n.79.
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between them, by stating that personal jurisdiction is more likely to
exist in cases where the claim "arise[s] out of or [is] connected
with" 4 1 the defendant's in-state contacts. This phrase could mean
(1) that the connected with test is dominant, and personal jurisdic-
tion exists whenever the claim either arises out of a defendant's con-
tacts or is in any other way connected with the defendant's contacts
with the forum, or (2) that the arises out of test is dominant, and the
claim must usually arise out of the defendant's contacts, although
there may be compelling cases for specific jurisdiction where there
are other types of connection between the claim and the defendant's
contacts.
If the connected with test dominates, then specific and general
jurisdiction are better characterized as endpoints of a continuum.
At one end of the continuum is general jurisdiction, where a defen-
dant has a high level of contacts with the forum that are unrelated to
the claim. At the other end of the continuum is specific jurisdiction,
in which the defendant has a single contact with the forum that re-
lated intimately to the claim. In the middle is a gray area of personal
jurisdiction, in which the defendant has a moderate level of contacts
that are moderately related to the claim. The connected with test
allows personal jurisdiction to exist in this gray area because it al-
lows personal jurisdiction based on contacts that are somewhat con-
nected with the claim, but fall short of the type of causation
necessary to support arises out of relatedness.
If the arises out of test for relatedness is dominant, then general
and specific jurisdiction are better characterized as "pigeonholes,"
because there would be no gray area between a claim arising out of
and a claim not arising out of a defendant's contacts with the forum.
On this view, a claim that arises out of a defendant's contacts with
the forum will generally support specific jurisdiction, while a claim
not arising out of the defendant's contacts will not support specific
jurisdiction, regardless of how continuous and systematic the defen-
dant's contacts are.
This Note argues that a version of the arises out of test is pref-
erable to the connected with test and adopts Professor Lea
Brilmayer's method 42 for distinguishing between those connections
that can support personal jurisdiction and those that cannot. First,
however, this Note considers the possibility that all types of "con-
nection" can support personal jurisdiction.
41 326 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).
42 See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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a. General and Specific Jurisdiction on a Continuum
If the connected with 43 standard controls or has significance in-
dependent of the arises out of language44 then general and specific
jurisdiction can be viewed as opposite ends of a continuum. At one
end are cases involving a single contact, intimately connected with
the claim. 45 At the other end are cases involving contacts which,
although very continuous and systematic, are completely unrelated
to the claim.46 Along the continuum are cases with growing levels
of contacts and falling degrees of relatedness.
As an example of this middle ground, consider the case of a
motorist from New York who drives through Connecticut to Massa-
chusetts, and injures a pedestrian in Massachusetts. 47 To give the
motorist more contacts with Connecticut than a single trip through
the state, assume that she frequently, but not "continuously and sys-
tematically," drives through Connecticut on her way to Massachu-
setts. The motorist's contacts with Connecticut are connected with
the accident in Massachusetts, insofar as one of those contacts is
part of the chain of events leading up to the accident. Connecticut
should not be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over the New
York motorist in a suit filed by the pedestrian. The defendant's con-
tacts with Connecticut are slight, in terms of both the number of
trips and their connectedness to the claim. Furthermore, specific
jurisdiction and general jurisdiction can be respectively had in Mas-
sachusetts, the site of the accident, and New York, the domicile of
the defendant.48
43 This standard is also referred to as the related to standard. See Helicol, 466 U.S.
408, 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44 Id.
45 See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
46 See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
47 See Lea Brilmayer, Colloquy, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARv. L.
REV. 1444, 1445 (1988).
48 Professor Richman offers several hypotheticals to suggest instances where juris-
diction should exist, despite only moderate levels of contacts that are only slightly re-
lated to the claim. Richman, supra note 40, at 1343 n.61. First, he cites Lee v. Walworth
Valve Co., 482 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1973), in which the plaintiff's husband was killed at
sea by a valve manufactured by the defendant. Although the particular valve in question
was not sold in South Carolina, the defendant did sell valves in South Carolina and had
other contacts with the state, apparently related to its valve sales. The Fourth Circuit
held that the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in South Carolina even
though the claim did not arise out of the defendant's contacts and the contacts were
insufficient to support general jurisdiction.
Richman argues that this case illustrates the propriety ofjurisdiction in the middle
ground between specific and general jurisdiction. At least two alternative interpreta-
tions of the case are possible. Rather than using the arises out of test, the facts could fall
within Professor Brilmayer's "substantive relevance" test, therefore making this a case
of specific jurisdiction. Alternatively, the case could be wrongly decided. If the plain-
tiff's interests in having a convenient forum are ignored, it becomes clear that the defen-
1993]
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In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall49 (Helicol), the most
recent Supreme Court case to address general and specific jurisdic-
tion, the Court declined to analyze the possible differences between
the arises out of and related to standards. 50 The defendant, a Co-
lombian corporation, had the following contacts with Texas: (1) it
sent its chief executive officer to Texas to negotiate a contract to
provide helicopter service to the plaintiff; (2) it accepted checks
from the plaintiff drawn on a Texas bank account; (3) it purchased
helicopters, equipment, and training services from a Texas manu-
facturer; and (4) it sent personnel to that manufacturer's facilities
for training.5 1 Subsequent to these contacts, a helicopter owned by
the defendant crashed in Peru.52 The Supreme Court held that be-
cause the helicopter crash did not "arise out of" the defendant's
Texas contacts, Texas state courts had no specific jurisdiction over
the case. Additionally, the Court found that because the defen-
dant's contacts were less than continuous and systematic, they could
not support general jurisdiction in Texas. 53
Justice Brennan argued in dissent that arises out of and related
to should be regarded as distinct tests.54 In this way, direct causal
links between a defendant's in-state contacts and the claim would
always give rise to specific jurisdiction under the arises out of test.
More attenuated contacts, however, might still support specific ju-
risdiction via the related to test.55 Justice Brennan concluded that:
dant's contacts really had nothing to do with the claim. The contacts may have been
similar to the type of activities that gave rise to the claim, but they were not related to the
claim.
Richman's second hypothetical involves an Illinois-based pharmaceutical company
that sells an antacid product nationwide. A California resident regularly uses this brand
of antacid in California. On a trip to New York, the California resident purchases a
defective antacid tablet and is injured. Richman argues that California should have ju-
risdiction over the pharmaceutical company because the California resident would not
have purchased the antacid in New York had it not been for his familiarity with the
product in California. If a California court can exercise jurisdiction over the pharmaceu-
tical company, it is only because the California resident's prior purchases of the antacid
are substantively related to the claim. If the substantive relation test fails, it is not im-
plausible to say that only Illinois and New York (exercising general and specific jurisdic-
tion, respectively) can exercise jurisdiction over the pharmaceutical company on this
claim and that California has no jurisdiction over the pharmaceutical company with re-
spect to this claim.
49 466 U.S. 408 (1984).




54 466 U.S. at 419-428 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (because the parties conceded, per-





[A] court's specific jurisdiction should be applicable whenever the
cause of action arises out of or relates to the contacts between the
defendant and the forum. It is eminently fair and reasonable, in
my view, to subject a defendant to suit in a forum with which it has
significant contacts directly related to the underlying cause of
action.56
Thus, injustice Brennan's view, the two tests should be read as
separate: Personal jurisdiction may be proper in cases where the
defendant lacks continuous and systematic contacts, provided that
the claim either arises out of those contacts or is otherwise con-
nected with them. This reading rests on the plausible assumption
that arising out of refers to only one form of connection that may
exist between the claim and the defendant's contacts.
It is important to note that the relatively specific arises out of
language has not been merely absorbed into the more general and
inclusive connected with standard.57 Regardless of the independent
jurisdictional significance of the defendant's contacts at the time a
suit is commenced (such contacts can support personal jurisdiction
only under a connected with standard and not under an arises out of
standard), the defendant's contacts at the time of accrual must be
regarded as relevant because these are the only contacts that can
support personal jurisdiction under an arises out of standard. The
only way a claim can "arise out of" the defendant's contacts is if
those contacts exist prior to or simultaneously with the accrual of
the claim. A claim cannot be said to arise out of contacts that did
not exist until after the claim arose.
If the arises out of standard for specific jurisdiction is incorpo-
rated into the broader connected with standard, and if the con-
nected with standard is regarded as indicating that specific and
general jurisdiction exist on a continuum, it becomes necessary to
inquire into the continuous and systematic nature of contacts at the
time of accrual. This is because only contacts that exist at the time
of accrual are relevant to the "arises out of" standard for specific
jurisdiction, and specific jurisdiction is on a continuum with general
jurisdiction.
It is unclear how continuous and systematic contacts at the time
an action is commenced would fit onto such a continuum. Putting
such contacts on the continuum would require courts to deal with a
difficult temporal incongruity. It would also require courts to bal-
ance the relatedness of time-of-accrual contacts with the continu-
ousness of time-of-commencement contacts. There seems to be
56 466 U.S. at 427-428 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
57 In Helicol, the majority absorbed the relatively general "connected with" stan-
dard into the more specific "arises out of" standard. 466 U.S. at 415.
1993] 719
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
little question, however, that continuous and systematic contacts at
the time of commencement are a valid basis for personal jurisdic-
tion. 58 Thus, the pigeonhole model may provide a better explana-
tion for the relationship between specific and general personal
jurisdiction.
b. General and Specific Jurisdiction as "Pigeonholes"
If the arises out of test controls, then it is best to view general
and specific jurisdiction as pigeonholes for determining personal ju-
risdiction.59 The arises out of test is narrower than the connected
with standard because it implies a tighter causal connection between
the contacts and the claim. Thus, either the claim arises out of the
in-state contacts, or it does not. If it does arise out of the defen-
dant's contacts and those contacts are sufficiently numerous, specific
jurisdiction exists. In Helicol,60 for example, the defendant's con-
tacts with Texas were connected with the claim: the defendant's
equipment came from Texas and it trained its pilots in Texas. How-
ever, the cause of action did not arise out of those contacts.
The precise contours of the arises out of test, like those of the
connected with test, are not entirely clear. Obviously, the arises out
of relationship must be closer than merely being connected with the
claim, but both standards remain vague. Professor Brilmayer has
taken a different approach to the question, treating the "arises out
of or is connected with" language as a simple requirement that
there be an adequate nexus between the cause of action and the
forum with which the defendant has contacts. 61 If the nexus is too
weak, there should be no specific jurisdiction. Professor Brilmayer
argues that such a nexus exists when facts of "substantive rele-
vance" 62 occur in the forum district. She develops the concept of
substantive relevance through an analogy to storytelling. If a cer-
tain fact is viewed as relevant to the story-that is, if it is not a di-
gression-then it has weak substantive relevance. 63 If the same fact
is relevant to the applicable law, rather than to the story, then it has
58 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (presence in the state
at the time of commencement is sufficient to support personal jurisdiction).
59 As illustrated by International Shoe's first scenario, these pigeonholes need not be
mutually exclusive. A defendant may have such a high level of contacts with the state
that any link between those contacts and the claim would be unnecessary to support
jurisdiction. At the same time, however, the defendant's contacts might also be the
source of the claim.
60 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
61 Brilmayer, supra note 47, at 1451-58.
62 Id. at 1451.
63 Id. at 1452-55.
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"strong" substantive relevance.64 Each substantively relevant fact is
associated with a geographic location, such as Massachusetts as the
locale of the accident in the example of the New York motorist.
These geographic locations, with which the defendant has some
level of contact, are the ones that Professor Brilmayer claims have
sufficient nexus with the cause of action to support specific
jurisdiction.
Given the foregoing analytical framework, it becomes easier to
see that specific jurisdiction is not proper in places where both the
level of contacts and the level of relatedness are moderate, such as
Connecticut in the example of the New York motorist. If personal
jurisdiction is to be proper in such cases, it must consist of general,
rather than specific, jurisdiction. But by the terms of the hypotheti-
cal, the contacts in such cases are less than "continuous and system-
atic," thereby making general jurisdiction unavailable as well.
c. Summary
Specific and general jurisdiction should be regarded as pige-
onholes, and not as the endpoints of a continuum.65 They are ana-
lytically different concepts. Specific jurisdiction deals with a
defendant's contacts with a forum at the time the claim accrues. It
turns on the nexus between that forum and the cause of action.
Under Professor Brilmayer's model, specific jurisdiction may be
supported by contacts out of which the claim arises, as well as other
contacts which are substantively relevant to the claim. General ju-
risdiction, on the other hand, deals with a defendant's contacts at
the time of the commencment of the action. The level of contacts is
the crucial aspect for general jurisdiction.
One consequence of this conclusion is that contacts-nexus com-
binations in the middle of the continuum fail to support personal
jurisdiction. This outcome should not be of much concern. The
defendant is bound to have continuous and systematic contacts with
some forum, thereby making it a proper forum to exercise general
jurisdiction.66 Likewise, there must be some place where substan-
64 Id. at 1455-58. It is important to note that the relevance of particular facts could
change, depending on what forum's law is deemed applicable under state and federal
choice of law doctrines.
65 This conclusion does not exclude the existence of a self-contained continuum
with respect to specific jurisdiction alone. Professor Richman's instinct is sound insofar
as it claims that an increased level of contacts can substitute for reduced relatedness, and
vice versa, in determining specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction, however, is analyti-
cally distinct from any such continuum. Relatedness is irrelevant to general jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the timing of contacts relevant to general jurisdiction is different from the
timing of contacts relevant to specific jurisdiction.
66 If the defendant is domiciled or incorporated outside the United States, that
venue might be in another country.
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tively relevant facts occurred, thereby making specific jurisdiction a
possibility in that forum.67
3. "Doing Business" vs. "Continuous and Systematic Contacts"
Prior to 1988, the venue statute partly defined corporate resi-
dence in terms of whether the defendant was "doing business" in
the forum. 68 The doing business standard developed in cases in-
volving corporations as a rough analogue to the "physical presence"
basis of jurisdiction over natural persons.69 The next two subsec-
tions discuss the timing (accrual or commencement) and level (more
than, less than, or equal to "continuous and systematic") of contacts
necessary to support a finding that a corporation is doing business
in a forum.
a. Timing of Contacts Under "Doing Business"
A corporation that is doing business in a state is regarded as
physically present in that state during the period in which it is doing
business. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the use of physi-
cal presence as a basis for personal jurisdiction in Burnham v. Superior
Court.70 Because the relevant time for presence-based jurisdiction is
the period of the presence, 7 1 a defendant is subject to personal ju-
risdiction only while actually present in the state. By analogy then, a
corporation that is doing business in a state should only be subject
to personal jurisdiction during the time it is actually doing business
there.
b. Level of Contacts Under "Doing Business"
Like general personal jurisdiction, the doing business standard
often permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant in
claims unrelated to the defendant's business dealings in the state.72
Authorities are split as to precisely what level of contacts is neces-
sary to qualify as doing business.73 Both lines of authority, however,
67 Again, the defendant's jurisdiction-conferring contacts may be outside the U.S.
68 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1976), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1991).
69 See generally FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.7 (1985).
70 495 U.S. 604.
71 Suppose a defendant was in California when he was supposed to be performing a
contract in South Dakota. Then, by the time the plaintiff files suit for breach of contract,
the defendant has wandered through 15 states and is now in South Carolina. No valid
justification exists for subjecting the defendant to suit in California or any of the 15
intervening states.
72 See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 1137-38.
73 Ford Motor Co. v. Chroma Graphics, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
There is split authority as to whether "doing business" for purposes of
§ 1391(c) should be construed as business activities sufficient to meet the
"minimum contacts" tests for personal jurisdiction, or business activities
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indicate that the level of contacts for doing business must be at least
as high as that needed to support personal jurisdiction. 74 The two
tests are somewhat different in scope. The broader of these, known
as the "jurisdiction test,"' 75 equates doing business with personal ju-
risdiction.76 In other words, if a court can exercise personal juris-
diction over a defendant, that defendant is deemed to be doing
business in the district. This test includes both general and specific
personal jurisdiction. The other test, known as the "licensing
test,"'77 "equates 'doing business'.., with state corporate licensing
requirements. ' 7 8 This latter test seems to be more closely parallel
to general jurisdiction alone.
E. Lawrence Vincent proposes the reconciliation of these two
tests through an application of the distinction between general and
specific jurisdiction. He concludes that doing business should be
regarded as identical with general jurisdiction, and that contacts suf-
ficient only for specific jurisdiction should not count as doing busi-
ness.79 Mr. Vincent's prioposal is sound. Because the doing
business test is used to determine the places of corporate residence,
it makes sense that corporations should be deemed to reside only
where they have general jurisdiction-type contacts.
II
ANALYSIS
Building on the concepts of general and specific jurisdiction de-
veloped in Part I, this Part discusses the possible situations in which
venue should, and should not, be proper in a given court. Section A
sets forth a series of hypothetical cases formulated to highlight the
that exhibit the sort of localized or intrastate character such that the state
is permitted under the Commerce Clause to require the corporation to
qualify to do business there.
678 F. Supp. at 170 (citations omitted). The Ford court held that the more stringent
Commerce Clause standard is preferable. Id. at 171; see also Scott Paper Co. v. Nice-Pak
Products, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Del. 1988) (same).
74 See Ford Motor Co., 678 F. Supp. at 169; David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdic-
tion and Practice Under the new Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 123 F.R.D. 399,
406 (1989) ("[some courts have refused] to find a corporation to be 'doing business' in
the state under the old [section 1391(c)] (so as to satisfy venue) merely because it was
doing just enough to meet the demands of a state longarm statute (and thus satisfy
jurisdiction)").
75 See E. Lawrence Vincent, Note, Defining "Doing Business" to Determine Corporate
Venue, 65 TEx. L. Rtv. 153, 155 (1986).
76 See, e.g. Smith v. Intex Recreation Corp., 755 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. La. 1991).
77 Vincent, supra note 75, at 155.
78 Id. For an example of the licensing test, see Scotch Whisky Ass'n v. Majestic
Distilling Co., 681 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
79 Vincent, supra note 75, at 173.
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relationship between the type of a defendant's activities in a state80
and the timing of those activities. Section B then defines and dis-
cusses the contours of a hypothetical venue statute that would codify
the conclusions of Section A.
A. Four Hypothetical Cases
These four hypothetical cases represent the permutations that
result from combining the time of relevant contacts (accrual or com-
mencement) with the type of contacts (substantively relevant8 l or
continuous and systematic).8 2 The four time-type combinations of
contacts will facilitate a clearer understanding of specific and gen-
eral personal jurisdiction, which in turn will clarify the meaning of
section 1391 and its references to personal jurisdiction. Notice that
the contrast in the type of contacts is not a contrast between high
and low levels of contacts, but instead parallels the concepts of spe-
cific and general jurisdiction. As such, it focuses on the relationship
between the defendant's contacts with the forum and the claim, and
the level of the contacts in the forum.
Most of the cases cited in this Section do not explicitly address
the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction. The cases
are surprisingly uniform, however, in suggesting that the judges
may rely on common intuition. This Section seeks to formalize
those intuitions and express them within the framework of the type
and timing of a defendant's contacts.
1. Continuous & Systematic Contacts at Time of Accrual
The first hypothetical involves the case in which the defendant
had continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state at the
time the claim accrued, but subsequently withdrew from the state
before the suit was filed. For example: Toxics Incorporated had
continuous and systematic contacts with Wyoming at the time
Timmy Treehugger was maimed in an accident with a Toxics Incor-
porated weather balloon in New Mexico. Toxics Incorporated's ac-
tivities with weather balloons in New Mexico were completely
unrelated to its operations in Wyoming. After the accident, but
before Timmy filed suit in Wyoming federal court, Toxics Incorpo-
rated withdrew its contacts from Wyoming. At the time Timmy filed
80 The use of the term "state" might be slightly inaccurate, because the relevant
geographic area is sometimes a judicial district that covers only a portion of a state's
territory. This issue of multidistrict states, for the purposes of this Note, is not signifi-
cant. For simplicity, except where otherwise noted, this Note assumes the existence of
one judicial district per state.
81 As would lead to specific jurisdiction.
82 As would lead to general jurisdiction.
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suit, Toxics Incorporated had no contacts with Wyoming. There-
fore, Wyoming should not have personal jurisdiction over Toxics
Incorporated for Timmy's injury in New Mexico.
In Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. C. F. Rollins,8 3 the Fourth Circuit
held that personal jurisdiction does not exist over the defendant in
such a case, reversing the district court.84 The plaintiff, a Georgia
resident, was injured in Georgia by machinery that had been manu-
factured by the defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation. The plaintiff
brought suit in South Carolina to take advantage of that state's six-
year statute of limitations, and based its claim of jurisdiction over
the defendant on the defendant's contacts with South Carolina at
the time the claim accrued. These contacts were completely unre-
lated to the accident in Georgia. The Fourth Circuit held that South
Carolina's door-closing statute barred the bringing of this action in
South Carolina. While the actual basis for the decision was the
door-dosing statute, the court's language indicates general disfavor
with such attempted bases of jurisdiction: "South Carolina's rela-
tively long six year statute of limitations, rather than any nexus with
the facts giving rise to this claim, dictated Rollins' choice of
forum." 85
2. Related Contacts at Time of Accrual
The second hypothetical also addresses cases in which the de-
fendant had contacts with the forum when the claim arose. In this
hypothetical, however, the claim arose out of or was connected with
the defendant's contacts. The defendant had no contacts with the
forum state at the time the suit was filed. For example: Toxics In-
corporated was shipping a truckload of toxic waste through
Oklahoma when the truck ran over Timmy Treehugger's sister,
Tammy, who was standing on the highway to protest Toxics Incor-
porated's new program of trucking waste through Oklahoma. Due
to the attendant bad publicity, that truckload was the only one Tox-
ics Incorporated ever sent into or through Oklahoma. Tammy filed
83 634 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1980).
84 C. F. Rollins v. Proctor & Schwartz, 478 F. Supp. 1137 (D.S.C. 1979), rev'd, 634
F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1980).
85 634 F.2d at 739. Compare this statement with dictum from the district court's
opinion:
It is interesting to note, at the outset, that Proctor & Schwartz closed a
plant in Rock Hill, South Carolina, which it had operated for over ten
(10) years, just five (5) months before this cause of action arose in May,
1972. Had this plant been operating at the time of the plaintiff's injury,
the court could readily find that Proctor & Schwartz had so injected itself
into the community and affairs of this state that notions of fundamental
fairness would not be offended by holding it to be "doing business" here.
478 F. Supp at 1139 (citing Snyder, 357 F.2d 552, 556).
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suit in Oklahoma federal court.86 Therefore, Oklahoma should ex-
ercise personal jurisdiction over Toxics Incorporated.
Perhaps the best-known case of related contacts at accrual is
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 87 In McGee, Franklin, a Cali-
fornia resident, bought a life insurance policy from an Arizona in-
surer. Later, International Life Insurance Co. (Int'l Life), a Texas
corporation, assumed the Arizona insurer's obligations and ac-
cepted premiums from Franklin. Although Franklin's policy was
Int'l Life's only known contact with California, the Supreme Court
held that the contact was sufficient to support jurisdiction in Califor-
nia, because the claim was based on "a contract which had [a] sub-
stantial connection" 88 with California.8 9 The Court also listed
several policy concerns that would be served by allowing the parties
to litigate in California: a state interest in providing "means of re-
dress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims," 90
the fact that individuals could not afford to litigate small or moder-
ate claims in a distant forum, 91 and the location of crucial
witnesses. 92
Another variation on this fact pattern is found in Snyder v. East-
ern Auto Distributors, Inc. 93 Eastern, an automobile distributor incor-
porated in Virginia, had a seven year franchise agreement with
Snyder, a South Carolina auto dealer. Before the conclusion of the
franchise term, Eastern canceled its agreement with Snyder, thus
terminating all of its contacts in South Carolina. Snyder sued in
South Carolina to recover damages for Eastern's allegedly unjusti-
fied cancellation of the agreement. The Fourth Circuit, finding
venue to be proper, held that "[t]he focal time in determining
whether Eastern is subject to the Court's jurisdiction and whether
86 This case can be distinguished from World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S 286 (1980), because there, the defendant was merely the seller of the car that
ultimately went into Oklahoma.
87 355 U.S. 220 (1957); see also Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822, 827
(10th Cir. 1963) ("A foreign corporation which has ceased to do business in a state is
still subject to service of process in suits on causes of action which arose out of business
carried on by the defendant in the state.") (citation omitted).
88 McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
89 Note that on Franklin's death, International Life's contact with California neces-
sarily ended. To understand why the contact ended, imagine telling the story of this
case, ending with the action by International Life that created the claim-its refusal to
pay. Had International Life paid the claim, it would have had no further dealings in
California. Therefore, because there could have been no contacts between International
Life and California at the time the action was commenced, the relevant time in McGee
was the time of accrual.
90 McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 357 F.2d 552.
[Vol. 78:707
NOTE-TIMING OF CONTACTS
venue is proper is when the cause of action arose.' ' 94 Eastern's seven
year relationship with Snyder in South Carolina would seem to make
this a case of continuous and systematic contacts sufficient to sup-
port general jurisdiction, however Eastern's contacts with South
Carolina were intimately related to the claim, and should therefore
be considered as grounds for specific jurisdiction. 95
Treating Snyder as a case of specific jurisdiction, rather than one
of general jurisdiction, also highlights that specific and general juris-
diction are analytically distinct concepts. Specific jurisdiction de-
pends on the relation of the contacts to the claim, with the level of
contacts playing only a minor threshold role. General jurisdiction,
on the other hand, depends entirely on the existence of a sufficiently
high level of contacts, with no regard to the relation of the contacts.
Thus, if the level of contacts at the time of commencement is contin-
uous and systematic, and if the contacts at accrual are substantively
related to the claim, then the defendant is subject to both specific
and general jurisdiction.
3. Continuous & Systematic Contacts at Time of Commencement
This hypothetical presents the type of case in which the defen-
dant had no contacts with the forum state at the time the claim ac-
crued, but it subsequently established continuous and systematic
contacts with the forum state. Assume for example, that a Toxics
Incorporated product fatally injured Timmy Treehugger but before
the Treehugger estate filed suit,96 Toxics Incorporated relocated its
principal headquarters to Vermont, a state with which it had no
prior contact. After Toxics Incorporated opened its new corporate
headquarters in Bennington, the Treehugger estate filed suit against
Toxics Incorporated in Vermont federal court.97 In this scenario,
Vermont should exercise personal jurisdiction over Toxics Incorpo-
rated in any action filed by the Treehugger estate.
A recent case from the Fourth Circuit provides a good illustra-
tion of this scenario. 98 In Tenefrancia v. Robinson Export & Import
Corp. ,99 Tenefrancia, a Florida resident, was injured in Virginia in an
accident allegedly caused by Robinson Export, a Virginia corpora-
94 357 F.2d at 556 (emphasis in original).
95 This view is supported by the court's language: "Having conducted its affairs in
South Carolina for a period of seven years, Eastern remained answerable therefor its
contract responsibilities for a reasonable time after cessation of its business in the state."
357 F.2d. at 556 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
96 See supra parts II.A.1.
97 Instead of Wyoming, the place of the tort, or Oklahoma, the previous location of
Toxic Incorporated's headquarters, assume that the estate filed suit in Vermont.
98 See also R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. Alumisteel Sys., Inc., 88 F.R.D. 629 (D.
Md. 1980).
99 921 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1990).
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tion. Tenefrancia filed suit in Maryland, m00 where Robinson Export
became licensed to do business approximately one year after the ac-
cident and two years before Tenefrancia filed suit. Robinson Export
apparently had no contacts with Maryland at the time the claim
arose. The court noted that the statute is worded in the present
tense ("is doing business"), 101 therefore the relevant contacts for
venue purposes are those that exist at the time the action is com-
menced. The court distinguished Snyder on the ground that the ra-
tionale of Snyder was to prevent a defendant from escaping liability
by fleeing a state, 10 2 a concern completely irrelevant to this case,
because the plaintiff was attempting to base jurisdiction on Robin-
son Export's entry into the forum state after the claim had accrued.
The court further argued that the 1966 amendments to section
1391 (a)103 adequately covered the venue question in cases like Sny-
der by providing that venue is proper in the judicial district where
the claim arose.' 0 4
4. Related Contacts at Time of Commencement
The fourth permutation presents the case in which the defen-
dant had no contacts with the forum state at the time the claim ac-
crued, but subsequently established a low level of contacts with the
forum state. These contacts, which are less than continuous and
systematic, are, however, related to the cause of action. Assume, for
example, that when Toxics Incorporated ran over Tammy Treehug-
ger, it was shipping the first of what it had hoped to be many truck-
loads of toxic waste from Arkansas to Nevada. However, Tammy
Treehugger's tragic plight rallied the local residents, who formed a
powerful political action group that succeeded in stopping the flow
of toxic waste through Oklahoma. Consequently, Toxics Incorpo-
rated was forced to route the waste through Kansas. After Toxics
Incorporated's first shipment through Kansas, Tammy Treehugger
filed suit in Kansas federal court for her injuries from the Oklahoma
accident.' 0 5 Toxics' presence in Kansas is causally related to the
Treehugger incident in Oklahoma because but for the accident with
Tammy Treehugger, Toxics Incorporated would not have com-
100 Apparently to avoid Virginia's expired statute of limitations. See 921 F.2d at 557.
101 28 U.S.C § 1391(c) (1976), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1991) ("A cor-
poration may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do
business or is doing business.").
102 921 F.2d at 558-59.
103 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1966) provided, for the first time, that venue in diversity
suits is proper in the judicial district where the claim arose.
104 921 F.2d at 559-61.




menced shipping toxic waste through Kansas. In such a case, in
which there in an indirect causal connection and the contacts are not
contiguous and systematic, Kansas should not exercise personal ju-
risdiction over Toxics Incorporated.
No cases of this type have been reported. 10 6 Under Professor
Brilmayer's "substantive relevance" for related contacts, it would be
impossible for such in-state contacts to possess the requisite nexus
with a claim to support specific jurisdiction. 10 7 To apply Professor
Brilmayer's storytelling analogy to substantive relevance, one would
ask whether there is any way to tell the story of Tammy Treehug-
ger's injury-particularly if only legally relevant facts are included-
where Toxics Incorporated's subsequent move to Kansas would not
be viewed as a digression. Toxics Incorporated's new shipping
route could not possibly be important to the question of whether
Toxics Incorporated is at fault for Tammy Treehugger's injury.108
This hypothetical illustrates that the "subject to personal juris-
diction at the time the action is commenced" 10 9 language, if read
literally, is nonsensical insofar as it applies to specific personal juris-
diction if the phrase "at the time the action is commenced" is inter-
preted to indicate the relevant time for examining a defendant's
contacts with a forum. In other words, if we start with the statutory
text, "subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is com-
menced," then substitute a description of specific jurisdiction for
the term "personal jurisdiction" in the statutory language, the result
is a text stating that venue is proper where the defendant "had sub-
stantially relevant contacts with the forum at the time the cause of
action accrued[,] at the time the action is commenced." Under such
interpretation, the two timing limitations seem to contradict one an-
other. One of three explanations must be true: (1) the premise that
specific jurisdiction depends on contacts at the time of accrual is
incorrect, (2) the phrase "at the time the action is commenced" indi-
cates something other than when the contacts should occur, 110 or
106 But see CLERMONT, supra note 40, at 152-53. Professor Clermont argues that con-
sent or waiver of objections to personal jurisdiction is the type of in-state act that is
sufficiently related to the claim to give rise to specific jurisdiction. This does not seem
correct. Consent is an act done in the process of litigating the action, not an act done in
the process of creating the cause of action. Professor Brilmayer's substantive relevance
test helps clarify this point. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. Someone tell-
ing the story of the claim would almost certainly not include "and then the defendant
consented to suit in the Western District of Washington."
107 See Helicol, 466 U.S. 408 at 428 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108 To say that the new shipping route is important to the story would be tanta-
mount to saying that it is important to know what happened to Scarlett O'Hara after
Rhett Butler walked out of her life. See MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND
(1936); ALEXANDRA RIPLEY, SCARLETr (1991).
109 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. 1991).
110 See infra part III.
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(3) Congress intended to limit venue under this clause to general
jurisdiction-type contacts. III There is no evidence that Congress in-
tended to so limit venue. Furthermore, specific jurisdiction does
depend on contacts at the time of accrual.' 12 Therefore, the phrase
"at the time the action is commenced" must indicate something
other than when the contacts should occur. This Note argues that
this language merely requires that personal jurisdiction, whether
specific or general, continue to exist over the defendant-in the par-
ticular claim-at the time the action is commenced. In cases of spe-
cific jurisdiction, for example, venue is proper where the defendant
had substantively relevant contacts with the forum at the time the
claim accrued, but venue is not proper over that defendant in claims
unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum. In cases of
general jurisdiction, venue is proper as long as the defendant has
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum. When those
contacts cease, general jurisdiction, and thus venue, becomes
improper.
B. A Hypothetical Venue Statute
As Section A demonstrates, venue is closely related to the con-
cepts inherent to personal jurisdiction. Some commentators, how-
ever, have asserted that the purpose of venue is "to insure that
litigation is lodged in a convenient forum and to protect defendant
against the possibility that plaintiff will select an arbitrary place in
which to bring suit."1 13 More specifically, venue statutes serve "the
purpose of protecting a defendant from the inconvenience of having
to defend an action in a trial court that is either remote from the
defendant's residence or from the place where the acts underlying
the controversy occurred."1 14
This purpose of venue-convenience-is not necessarily incom-
patible with a close interrelation between personal jurisdiction and
venue. The rise to prominence of the reasonableness branch of In-
ternational Shoe's two-part test for personal jurisdiction' 1 5 indicates
I11 See 1990 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6.
112 See supra notes 22-67 and accompanying text.
113 Clermont, supra note 18, at 431 (quoting 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1063 at 203 (1969)).
114 VDI Technologies v. Price, 781 F. Supp. 85, 92 (D.N.H. 1991) (citing VE Hold-
ing Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991)).
115 See Clermont, supra note 18, at 416-18, 451. See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). All three
cases apparently give the reasonableness branch of minimum contacts significance inde-
pendently of the power branch. For a commentary on Asahi and reasonableness, see
Earl M. Maltz, Comment, Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A
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that the law of personal jurisdiction increasingly serves the goal of
convenience.1 16 With personal jurisdiction fulfilling the purpose of
venue, there is a diminished need for a distinct or independent law
of venue." 17 This suggests that a venue statute should be phrased in
terms of, or at least indexed to, personal jurisdiction concepts. Fur-
thermore, the ready availability of transfer of venue between courts
where venue is proper in both the transferor court and the trans-
feree court 1 8 provides a further argument in favor of eliminating
the distinctions between jurisdiction and venue. It is no longer nec-
essary to ask whether the present forum is the most convenient place
to litigate the dispute; so long as it meets a minimal threshold of
convenience, the forum should be deemed a proper venue. If a
more convenient forum exists, 19 then the case can easily be trans-
ferred to that forum. A combined law of personal jurisdiction and
venue would simply seek to answer the question: Of those fora that
have power over a defendant, where will it be reasonable, fair, and
convenient to require that defendant to litigate? The following sub-
sections address the permutations of a venue statute that is based on
the type and timing of a defendant's contacts.
1. Venue in the Place of Accrual
First, the most logical district in which to allow a plaintiff to sue
is the one in which the defendant had contacts out of which the
claim arose; for example, venue is logical in the district in which a
defendant allegedly committed a tort. In such a case, factors weigh-
ing in favor of venue include the location of evidence and wit-
Comment on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DUKE LJ. 669
(1987).
116 Compare the purpose of venue, supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (part
I.B.1), with the factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of personal
jurisdiction: "When determining the reasonableness of the exercise of personal juris-
diction by a forum state, the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state,
and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief may be considered." Fogle v. Ramsey
Winch Co., 774 F. Supp 19, 22 (D. D.C. 1991).
117 See Clermont, supra note 18, at 430-41, 450-55; CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3801 at 4 n.4 (1986) (Supp.
1992).
118 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
119 Cases abound that list the relevant factors in the transfer of venue. Such factors
include: (1) plaintiff's choice of forum, (2) the convenience of the parties, (3) the con-
venience of the witnesses, (4) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (5) the
availability of process to compel attendance of unwilling witnesses, (6) consideration of
trial efficiency, and (7) the furtherance of the interest of justice. See, e.g., Davidson v.
Exxon Corp., 778 F. Supp. 909 (E. D. La. 1991); Lethbridge v. British Aerospace PLC,
1991 WL 233206 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Employers Ins. v. Triton Lines, Inc., 708 F.
Supp. 54, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Car-Freshener Corp. v. Auto Aid Mfg. Corp., 438 F.
Supp. 82, 85 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Saminsky v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 373 F. Supp.
257, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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nesses,' 20 as well as the strong state interest in ensuring the
enforcement of its laws. 12 The most direct wording of a statute to
provide for venue in such cases would be: "Venue is proper where
the claim arose." 122 While nonproblematic in most cases, this could
invite litigation over the issue of precisely where the claim arose.' 23
If, for example, the claim stems from business conducted through
the mails or electronic media, it might be impossible to identify a
single location where the claim arose. Assume, for example, that D,
a business in State X, advertises its widgets in State Y. P, a resident
of State Z on vacation in State Y, sees the advertisement and orders
a widget, requesting that it be mailed to his home in State Z. When
it turns out to be defective, thereby injuring P in State Z, where, of
State X, State Y, or State Z, did the claim arise? 124 All three states
have a significant relationship with the claim.
Since the phrase "where the claim arose" presents such
problems, the statute could be revised to read: "Venue is proper in
any state in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giv-
ing rise to the claim occurred." 125 In the example involving the sale
of widgets, this would arguably allow venue to be proper in State
X, 126 State y, 1 2 7 and State Z.128
2. Venue Where Related Contacts Exist at Accrual
Second, there are, at least theoretically, cases in which the de-
fendant had closely related contacts with the forum state at the time
of accrual that are neither (1) sufficient to support general jurisdic-
120 See, e.g. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); see also
cases cited supra note 119.
121 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 119.
122 Compare with pre-1990 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) ("A civil action ... may . .. be
brought ... in the judicial district ... in which the claim arose.").
123 In fact, this was Congress' primary motivation for amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(a) (2) to allow venue in districts where only "a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) (Supp. 1991); see
136 CONG. REC. S17581.
124 Such fact patterns are not at all far-fetched. See, e.g. Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961) (plaintiff injured in Illinois by the
explosion of a hot water heater, whose safety valve was manufactured in Ohio, sold to a
Pennsylvania water heater manufacturer, and then sold to an Illinois purchaser.).
125 Compare this version with the 1990 version of 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(a) ("A civil ac-
tion... may ... be brought only in... ajudicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.").
126 As the location from which D ordered the advertisements and shipped the wid-
get. (In practice, a more sound basis for personal jurisdiction and venue in State X
would perhaps be that D is presently domiciled there.)
127 As the location of the advertisements, and as the place from which P placed the
order.




tion nor (2) the source of the claim. For example, consider a train
accident on Michigan's upper peninsula in which the train derailed
and spilled its cargo. The train had to pass through Wisconsin to
reach the upper peninsula. The railroad's contacts with Wisconsin
are clearly related to the accident, however, it is doubtful in the ab-
sence of other facts that a credible argument can be formulated that
the accident somehow arose out of those contacts. It is also doubt-
ful that a credible argument can be formulated that Wisconsin,
rather than Michigan, would be a proper forum for this case.
The statutory formulation suggested in subsection one would
preclude venue where the defendant's actions are related to, but not
the source of, the claim. This follows because such events, although
related, do not give rise to the claim. Venue may not be proper in
Wisconsin in the Michigan train accident case, or in Connecticut in
the New York motorist case, but there may be cases in which a de-
fendant's contacts have substantive relevance, as defined by Profes-
sor Brilmayer, 129 while still falling short of being "events or
omissions out of which the claim arose." If so, then a statutory pro-
vision to cover these cases might read as follows:
Venue is proper in any judicial district in which a substantively
relevant event or omission occurred. A substantively relevant
event or omission shall be defined as any event or omission whose
occurrence or nonoccurrence would affect the outcome of the
case, when considering any substantive law applicable to the
claim.
3. Venue Where Continuous Contacts Exist at Commencement
A third statutory provision should address the propriety of
venue where the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts
at the time the action is commenced. Venue should be proper in
such cases because of the strong state interests both in regulating
businesses located there and in providing a convenient forum for
the state's residents.' 30 Presumably, the state interest in conven-
ience extends equally to residents who are defendants or plaintiffs.
A statute addressing these concerns could read as follows:
Venue is proper in any state in which the defendant has continu-
ous and systematic contacts at the time the action is commenced.
Continuous and systematic contacts are those contacts that would
be sufficient to subject the defendant to general personal jurisdic-
129 Supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
130 See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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tion, assuming that the relevant time for determining general per-
sonal jurisdiction is the time the action is commenced. 131
4. Venue Where Continuous Contacts Exist at Accrual
Fourth, some might argue that a thorough venue provision
should address the preservation of plaintiffs' rights of action against
defendants who, prior to commencement, lessen or withdraw from
continuous and systematic contacts that existed at the time of ac-
crual. It might read as follows:
Venue is proper in any state in which the defendant has such con-
tinuous and systematic contacts at the time the action accrues that
those contacts would be sufficient to subject the defendant to gen-
eral personal jurisdiction, assuming the relevant time for deter-
mining general personal jurisdiction is the time of accrual of the
claim. 132
At first glance, it might not make much sense to force a party to
defend lawsuits in the forum of its former corporate headquarters or
other residence if the claim is unrelated to the former activities at
that residence. For example, assume a corporation that maintained
corporate headquarters in New York injured a New Jersey resident
in Idaho. Further, assume that the corporation relocated its head-
quarters to Texas shortly after the time of accrual but before the
plaintiff commenced the action.
At least two policies, fairness and convenience, could plausibly
be served by compelling the defendant to litigate in New York.
First, a number of cases have favored the time of accrual as a proper
basis of venue, because of notions of fairness.' 3 3 This rationale
would urge that during the period that a corporation avails itself of
the protections of a state's laws, courts of that state should be al-
lowed to subject that corporation to the obligations of that state's
laws for claims that arose against the corporation during the period
of such availment. Further, New York might be more convenient to
the plaintiff than the place of the tort or the place of the defendant's
residence at the time of commencement. 3 4 Such convenience to
131 Some readers might object to the use ofjudicially created concepts, such as gen-
eral personal jurisdiction, in a statute. However, Congress drafted both versions of 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c) incorporating judicially created concepts. In the pre-1988 version,
Congress made the standard for proper venue whether the defendant was "doing busi-
ness" in the state. The drafters did not independently define the term "doing business."
Similarly, Congress relied on the judicial definition of "personal jurisdiction" in the
1988 version. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1991).
132 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (part II.A.1).
133 See cases cited in Annotation, 2 A.L.R. FED., supra note 4, at 995.
134 Under the 1990 version of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), Congress deleted the provision
that made venue proper in the plaintiff's place of residence.
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the plaintiff, however, is highly dependent upon the specific facts of
the case. If the plaintiff was a New Mexico resident, for example,
New York would probably not be a very desirable forum.
Other conditions might favor a different venue. For instance, at
the time of commencement, New York may contain no evidence rel-
evant to the suit;' 35 the state may be an inconvenient place for the
defendant to litigate; 36 and New York may have no desire to pro-
tect the interests of either non-resident party. Also, many states
have no desire expend their judicial resources on disputes that have
no direct nexus with the state. In Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. C. F.
Rollins,'3 7 for example, a federal court held that South Carolina's
door-closing statute precluded the laying of venue there because, at
the time of accrual, the defendant's continuous and systematic con-
tacts were unrelated to the claim.
Finally, when the inquiry is broadened to include all possible
claims against a defendant, rather than a single dispute, it becomes
apparent that requiring a defendant to litigate where it formerly had
continuous and systematic contacts serves neither fairness nor con-
venience. For example, imagine a corporation that maintained its
headquarters in Minnesota for ten years. During that period, twenty
unrelated claims arose against that corporation. No substantively
relevant facts occurred in Minnesota on any of those claims. After
the ten years, the corporation relocated to Florida, extinguishing all
ties with Minnesota. Two years after the company's relocation to
Florida, all twenty plaintiffs independently filed suit in Minnesota
against the corporation.'38 These unlikely but theoretically possible
circumstances illustrate the extreme inconvenience to which a de-
fendant could be placed if it was forced to defend suits where it used
to have continuous and systematic contacts.
5. Venue Where Related Contacts Exist at Commencement
Finally, a statutory provision allowing venue in cases in which
the defendant has contacts at the time of commencement that are
related to the cause of action would waste both judicial and private
resources.1 39 If Congress or the courts defined "relatedness" as the
existence of a logical link, then a statute providing proper venue in
places where related contacts exist at commencement would waste
judicial resources. It would invite burdensome discovery and litiga-
135 See, e.g., McGee, 355 U.S. at 220, 223 (indicating that the location of witnesses
may be an important factor in venue determinations).
136 Id. at 224.
137 634 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1980).
138 Assume no statute of limitations problems exist in the hypothetical.
139 See discussion supra part II.A.4.
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tion as to the precise relationship of the claim to whatever corporate
contacts are arguably sufficient to give rise to specific jurisdiction.
For example, a plaintiff might have some incentive to try to show
how a defendant's opening of a new McDonald's franchise in Maine
is related to a claim arising from the plaintiff's food poisoning at a
McDonald's owned by the defendant in Washington. Perhaps the
courts will never find this sort of relatedness sufficient to support
time-of-commencement specific jurisdiction, but the courts should
not rely on this possibility when construing the statute. If either
Congress or the courts applied Professor Brilmayer's substantive
relevance test for relatedness, then no contacts at the time of com-
mencement would ever be sufficiently related to support specific
jurisdiction. 140
6. Summary
The hypothetical venue statute should definitely provide for
venue in cases in which: the claim arose out of contacts that existed
at the time of accrual; 141 the claim is substantively related to the
contacts that existed at the time of accrual; 142 and the defendant has
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum at the time of
commencement. 143 It should exclude the possibility of venue in
cases in which the defendant has continuous but unrelated contacts
at the time of accrual 44 and cases in which the defendant has less-
than-continuous, but related, contacts at the time of commence-
ment. 145 Such a statute could be phrased as follows:
Venue is proper (a) in any state in which a substantial portion of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; (b) in
any judicial district in which a substantively relevant event or
omission occurred (a substantively relevant event or omission
shall be defined as any event or omission whose occurrence or
nonoccurrence would affect the outcome of the case, when con-
sidering any law applicable to the claim); or (c) in any state in
which the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts at the
time the action is commenced (continuous and systematic contacts
are those contacts that would be sufficient to subject the defen-
dant to general personal jurisdiction, assuming that the relevant
time for determining general personal jurisdiction is the time the
action is commenced).
140 See discussion supra part II.B.4.
141 See discussion supra part II.B. 1.
142 See discussion supra part II.B.2.
143 See discussion supra part II.B.3.
144 See discussion supra part I.B.4.
145 See discussion supra part II.B.5.
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In this formulation, section (a) describes the type of contacts
that would give a court specific personal jurisdiction under the
arises out of test. Section (b) provides for the kind of contacts that
would give rise to specific personal jurisdiction under Professor
Brilmayer's substantive relevance test. Finally, section (c) of the hy-
pothetical statute corresponds to the type of contacts that would al-
low for general personal jurisdiction. When considered together,
the drafters could ostensibly reduce these provisions to the concepts
embodied in personal jurisdiction by stating that: "Venue is proper
in any state where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction."
This abbreviated formulation may have too much densely-packed
information to be easily comprehensible, but its simplicity follows
the pattern of the 1988 version of section 1391(c). 146 Specifically,
section (c) of the hypothetical statute and its simplified version re-
semble the operative language of section 1391(c): "subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced."
The hypothetical venue statute achieves the goal of extending
venue to the limits of personal jurisdiction. 14 7 In doing so, how-
ever, it does not distinguish among the possible choices for venue to
encourage a plaintiff to choose the most convenient forum for the
litigants. That is, under the hypothetical venue statute, a plaintiff
intent on causing inconvenience for the defendants could force
them to litigate in the most remote place in which they are subject to
personal jurisdiction, rather than where they reside or where the
claim arose. Section 1391(a), as amended in 1992, serves just such a
channeling function and forces plaintiffs to look to more convenient
fora before choosing an inconvenient one. Part III of this Note dis-
cusses the method by which section 1391 accomplishes this
channeling.
III
SYNTHESIS: INTERPRETATION OF 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a) AND (C)
This Part discusses how courts should interpret sections
1391(a) and (c). In facilitating arguments for the interpretation of
those sections, Part I illuminated the background of the statute, as
well as the concepts of personal jurisdiction and venue. Part II dis-
cussed the circumstances under which venue should be proper in a
given forum, and hypothesized a codification of these circum-
stances. Part III now argues that courts should interpret the federal
venue statute broadly.
146 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1991).
147 See discussion supra part I.B.1.
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A. Section 1391(a)(3)
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity
of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in (1) a judicial district wherein any defendant re-
sides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial dis-
trict in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property
that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district
in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the
time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the
action may otherwise be brought. 148
When Congress amended section 1391(a) in 1990, it omitted a
key phrase in section 1391(a)(3) that would have limited that sub-
section's application to cases in which there was no judicial district
where the action could be brought under sections 1391(a)(1) or
(a)(2). This led courts and commentators to confusion and disa-
greement over section 1391(a)(3)'s meaning. Many courts uncriti-
cally' 49 treated the statute as providing that the plaintiff has filed
suit in the proper venue simply upon finding personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.150 Thus, these courts held that because they
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the plaintiff com-
menced suit in the proper venue, without further analysis. At least
one court' 5 ' and several prominent commentators15 2 argued that
because section 1391 (a) (3) provides for venue where "the defendants
148 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(a) (Supp. 1991), amended by Federal Courts Administration Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 504, 106 Stat. 4506, 4513 (1992).
149 While the courts' assumptions are not necessarily wrong, none of these deci-
sions, infra note 150, provide any analysis of the statute or possible alternate
interpretations.
150 See, e.g. Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1385 (8th
Cir. 1991); Dave Guardala Mouthpieces, Inc., v. Sugal Mouthpieces, Inc., 779 F. Supp.
335 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Generale Bank v. Wassel, 779 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y 1991);
Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Melvin Simon Prods., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 858, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Peregrine Corp. v. Peregrine Indus., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 169, 172 (C.D. Pa. 1991); Apple
Vacations, Inc. v. Dvornik, Civ. A. No. 91-4500, 1991 WL 243561, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
15, 1991); Manufacturas Int'l Ltda. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 91 Civ.
4892 (TPG), 1991 WL 230620, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1991);John Burgee Architects v.
Patrick, No. 91 Civ. 3023 (MJL), 1991 WL 222147, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1991); Uni-
versal Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Merchants Int'l, Inc., No. 91 C 3566, 1991 WL 214070, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1991); see also William F. Harvey, Federal Statutory Procedural Amend-
ments-1990, 34 Rss GEsTAE 546 (June 1991) (concluding that the new statute equates
venue with personal jurisdiction).
151 Harrison Conference Servs., Inc. v. Dolce Conference Servs., Inc., 768 F. Supp.
405, 407-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
152 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 3802.1 (Supp. 1991); John B. Oakley, Recent
Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of
1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 735, 769-82 (1991); David D. Siegel, Changes in
Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the New (Dec. 1, 1990) Judicial Improvements Act, 133
F.R.D. 61, 72-73 (1990).
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are subject to personal jurisdiction," 153 courts should limit it to
cases involving multiple defendants. Nobody could plausibly inter-
pret this language in a manner consistent with the purpose stated in
the legislative history. Section 1391 (a) (3) "[was] meant to cover the
cases in which no substantial part of the events happened in the
United States and in which all the defendants do not reside in the
same state."' 1 4 Apparently, Congress had omitted a portion of the
language it had intended to enact. Fortunately, Congress corrected
its error in 1992, thus relieving courts and commentators from hav-
ing to interpret section 1391(a)(3) in a manner that would have
abolished any separate venue requirement in diversity cases, an in-
terpretation that hinged on a single letter "s."
Section 1391(a), as amended in 1992, plays an important, ra-
tional, and effective role in ensuring that cases will be litigated in a
venue that is convenient. Section 1391(a)(1) renders venue proper
in a judicial district where "any defendant resides, if all defendants
reside in the same state."'155 Thus, for single defendants or multiple
defendants that reside in the same state, venue is literally laid at
their doorstep. Section 1391(a) (2) renders venue proper where "a
substantial portion of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim occurred."' 156 This language lays venue where specific juris-
diction-type events occurred. The term "substantial portion" is
somewhat ambiguous, and this Note submits that it should be inter-
preted in consonance with Professor Brilmayer's test for substantive
relevance.' 57 Section 1391 (a) (3) is available only if there is no place
in which venue would be proper under sections 1391 (a)(1) or (a)(2),
and essentially waives venue in such circumstances.
A plaintiff may seek to establish venue under section 1391(a) (3)
only if (1) there are multiple defendants that do not reside in the
same state 158 and (2) either the claim arose outside the U.S. or not
all of the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction where any
substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claim arose. 159 In
other words, section 1391 (a) (3) removes any constraints imposed by
venue requirements that are different from those imposed by per-
sonal jurisdiction when the combination makes it impossible to sue
anywhere in the U.S. on a claim in which at least one judicial district
can exercise personal jurisdiction over all defendants. This can ap-
parently occur only in two circumstances: (1) where multiple de-
153 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
154 1990 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6.
155 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) (Supp. 1991).
156 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) (Supp. 1991).
157 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
158 Thus making venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) impossible.
159 Thus making venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) impossible.
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fendants reside in different states and the claim arose outside the
United States, or (2) where multiple defendants reside in different
states and at least one defendant is not subject to personal jurisdic-
tion in any judicial district where a substantial portion of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.
An example of the first circumstance would be a situation in
which a plaintiff wished to sue two defendants for injuries suffered
as a result of a plane crash in Iceland. The first defendant, Ponco, is
an airplane manufacturer residing in California, and the second,
Precise, is an airplane guidance system manufacturer based in South
Dakota. Venue under section 1391 (a) (1) is impossible, because the
defendants do not reside in the same state. Venue under section
1391(a)(2) is also impossible, because the claim arose in Iceland.
An example of the second circumstance would include a scena-
rio in which a plaintiff bought a car from Pluto, an auto manufac-
turer residing only in West Virginia. Subsequently, the plaintiff had
the car tuned-up by Bob, an auto mechanic residing in Florida.
Later, Sam, an auto mechanic in Michigan, performed another tune-
up. After the tune-ups, the plaintiff drove the car to Texas, where
the transmission fell out, causing injuries to the plaintiff. The acci-
dent investigation is not yet sufficiently advanced to enable the
plaintiff to eliminate either Bob or Sam as a defendant. The plaintiff
wishes to sue Pluto, Bob and Sam. Venue under section 1391 (a)(1)
is improper because the defendants reside in different states. Venue
under section 1391 (a) (2) is improper because both Bob's and Sam's
contacts with Texas are too tenuous to subject them to personal ju-
risdiction there, and Bob and Sam are not subject to personal juris-
diction in Michigan and Florida, respectively. Thus, a maximum of
two defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in any given
state. Therefore, if the plaintiff can find any court in the U.S. that
can exercise personal jurisdiction over all three defendants, section
1391 (a) (3) waives any independent venue requirements.
In all cases that do not match the circumstances of these hy-
potheticals, venue must be laid either where the defendants reside
or where substantively relevant events occurred. 60 If the defend-
ants are corporations, their residence is defined by section 1391(c),
which is discussed in the next subsection.
This subsection's examination of section 1391 (a) (3) has thus far
treated the section as simply providing venue "where the defend-
ants are subject to personal jurisdiction," and has ignored the "at
the time the action is commenced" language. The omission has
been deliberate. "At the time the action is commenced" adds noth-
160 Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(1) or (a)(2).
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ing to the analysis.16 1 It simply requires the defendants to continue
to be subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum at the time the
action is commenced, regardless of when they first became subject
to personal jurisdiction there. For example, if the court exercises
specific personal jurisdiction-based on contacts related to the
claim that occurred at the time of accrual-then the court properly
exercises personal jurisdiction over defendants on that claim begin-
ning at the time the claim accrued and continuing indefinitely into
the future. If, however, the court relies on general personal juris-
diction-based on presence or domicile-then it may subject the de-
fendants to personal jurisdiction only during the duration of their
presence or domicile in the forum. 162
B. Section 1391(c)
For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a
corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in
which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is
commenced. In a State which has more than one judicial district
and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corpo-
ration shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within
which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal ju-
risdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is no
such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the dis-
trict in which it has the most significant contacts.
163
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended the
1988 amendment to section 1391(c) to limit corporate venue to the
judicial districts in multiple-district states in which the defendant
161 This interpretation comports with Siegel's interpretation of the "at the time the
action is commenced" language in § 1391(c):
Under the first sentence of subdivision (c), the measure of whether the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction is based on "the time the
action is commenced." That may not be very important when longarm
jurisdiction is being used, because longarm jurisdiction ordinarily de-
pends on some act or acts the defendant performed in the past (and, of
course, that the claim arises out of those acts). But it may be quite impor-
tant when the claim itself did not arise in the state and when jurisdiction
is based only on the corporation's current physical presence in the state.
That's the "doing business" test, and it ordinarily requires a showing that
the defendant was doing business in the state when the action was com-
menced. (The 'doing business' test explicitly listed as a venue basis
under the old subdivision (c) remains a venue basis under the new one
for the obvious reason that doing business in a state also makes the cor-
poration amenable to jurisdiction there.)
David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the New Judicial Improve-
ments and Access to Justice Act, 123 F.R.D. 399, 407 (1988).
162 See discussion supra part I.B.2.
163 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(c) (Supp. 1991).
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does business or has a significant level of activity.1 64 This conclusion
about Congress' intent is supported by the fact that the pre-1988
formulation seemingly allowed venue in any district in a multiple-
district state, even those districts with which the defendant had no
contacts. 165 The second sentence of the 1988 amendment to sec-
tion 1391(c), while appearing to rectify this problem, ultimately has
no net effect toward implementing Congress' goals.
To understand how the 1988 amendment had no effect on the
definition of corporate residence, consider two hypothetical corpo-
rations. The first, X, does business only in the Northern District of
New York, at a sufficient level to subject it to general personal juris-
diction in New York. The second, Y, is incorporated in New York.
Under the pre-1988 version of section 1391(c), X would reside only
in the Northern District, because that is a "judicial district in which
it is ... doing business."1 66 Y, on the other hand, resides in every
district in New York under the old statute, because a charter of in-
corporation applies throughout the state, not just in one particular
district.167 Under the new version of section 1391(c), X again would
be deemed to reside only in the Northern District. However, the
court would reach this result by a rather convoluted process: Doing
business in New York subjects X to personal jurisdiction throughout
New York, but the "most-significant-contacts" clause limits X's resi-
dence to the district where those contacts are located. 168 According
to the revised section 1391(c), the court may subject Y to personal
jurisdiction in New York. Because Y has no more or fewer contacts
with any particular district due to its mere incorporation, it resides
for venue purposes in all judicial districts in New York. Thus, the
amendment does not fulfill its stated purpose of limiting corporate
venue to districts in which a defendant engages in a significant level
of activity.
Because resolving the multiple-district problem is the only
stated goal of the amendment, Congress' shift in language from
"doing business" to "subject to personal jurisdiction" should not
be regarded as altering the type of contacts-specific or general-
necessary to qualify for residence. Therefore, courts should deem
164 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 6.
165 Id.
166 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1976).
167 This fact depends on the operation of state laws of incorporation, rather than on
the language of the statute, which provides that a corporation resides in "any judicial
district in which it is incorporated." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1976) (amended 1988). A
corporation incorporates in a state, not a judicial district. Therefore, if it is incorporated
in the state, the corporation is incorporated in every judicial district throughout the
state.
168 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1991).
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that a corporation resides wherever a court may exercise general or
specific jurisdiction over it.169 Cases and commentators support
this broad interpretation as the proper interpretation of section
1391 (c).1 70
Courts should interpret section 1391(c)'s inclusion of the "at
the time the action is commenced" language in harmony with sec-
tion 1391(a)(3), as because there is no reason to treat this phrase
differently between the two statutes. This phrase simply requires
that the defendant continue to be subject to personal jurisdiction in
the forum at the time the action is commenced, regardless of when
the defendant first became subject to personal jurisdiction there.
For proper venue, a court must exercise either specific personal ju-
risdiction, based on contacts that occurred at the time the claim
arose, or general personal jurisdiction, based on presence in the dis-
trict at the time of commencement of the suit.
C. Summary
As ultimately enacted with the 1992 amendments, sections
1391(a) and (c) present a logical and coherent treatment of venue.
Section 1391(a) simultaneously extends venue to the outer limits of
personal jurisdiction and establishes a priority system among possi-
ble venues to assure that the statute adequately serves the goal of
maximizing convenience. Section 1391(c) defines corporate resi-
dence broadly, to assure that corporations are amenable to suit in
the widest reasonable range of places.
Courts should interpret the language in sections 1391 (a) (3) and
(c) similarly in two respects. First, both should apply equally to
cases of general and specific personal jurisdiction. Second, the
phrase, "at the time the action is commenced" should not be inter-
preted to modify the concept of personal jurisdiction. Rather, this
phrase requires that any personal jurisdiction a forum possesses over
the defendants must continue to exist at the time the action is com-
menced-independent of the existence of the contacts that gave rise
to the personal jurisdiction, which may have occurred at the time of
accrual or at the time of commencement.
169 See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
170 See International Honeycomb Corp. v. Transtech Serv. Network, Inc., 742 F.
Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Evans v. American Surplus Underwriters Corp., 739 F.
Supp. 1526 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Siegel, supra note 163, at 407; see also Oakley, supra note
152, at 772 (arguing that section 1391 (c) "looks awkwardly to the law of personal juris-
diction to determine when venue is proper"). But see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117,





When Congress amended sections 1391(a) and (c) in 1988,
1990, and 1992, it remedied many of the statute's deficiencies. 171 In
that process, however, it also created new problems of interpreta-
tion. In particular, by explicitly relating venue to personal jurisdic-
tion,' 7 2 Congress increased the importance of precisely
understanding the concept and contours of personal jurisdiction. 173
Congress further muddied the statutory waters by providing for
venue in any judicial district in which the defendant is subject to
personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.' 7 4
Personal jurisdiction, a concept based on the defendant's rela-
tionship with the forum state, carries inherent notions of when the
defendant's contacts must occur in order to give a court personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.' 7 5 In appending "at the time the ac-
tion is commenced" to the requirement of personal jurisdiction,
Congress did not clarify whether the language should modify per-
sonal jurisdiction to require that the defendant's contacts exist at
commencement, or whether the phrase merely requires that the de-
fendant continue to be subject to personal jurisdiction on the claim
in the forum at the time the action is commenced. The latter of
these two views is preferable.
Personal jurisdiction consists of two distinct categories: specific
jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, the
court must consider only the defendant's contacts at the accrual of
the claim. For general jurisdiction, however, the court must inquire
only about the defendant's contacts at the time of the commence-
ment of the action. The "personal jurisdiction" language in sec-
tions 1391(a)(3)176 and (c)1 77 includes both categories of personal
jurisdiction. Therefore, the only logical reading of the phrase "at
the time the action is commenced" requires the existence or contin-
uation of the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant until
the commencement of the action.
171 See discussion supra part III.
172 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3), (c) (Supp. 1991).
173 Congress increased the importance of personal jurisdiction insofar as it restruc-
tured the law so that both personal jurisdiction and venue depend on the concepts im-
plicit in personal jurisdiction. Previously, an erroneous finding of personal jurisdiction,
which would have resulted in the case being heard in the wrong court, could be reme-
died by reference to an independent venue statute that would have required dismissal
on forum non conveniens grounds (or transfer to a proper venue). With the merging of
personal jurisdiction and venue, this safety net no longer exists.
174 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(3), (c) (Supp. 1991).
175 See discussion supra parts I.B.2, II.A, and II.B.
176 See discussion supra part III.A.
177 See discussion supra part III.B.
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Congress inserted the phrase "personal jurisdiction" as a con-
venient shorthand, without fully considering the implications of this
usage. This Note, by contrast, has considered the implications of
personal jurisdiction and its use in the federal venue statute. In
light of these implications, this Note has considered several possible
interpretations of sections 1391(a) and (c) and has offered sugges-
tions for the best interpretation of the statute. The task now passes
to the courts to implement section 1391. They should do so in a
manner consistent with this Note's recommendations.
Christian E. Mamment
t I wish to thank Professors Kevin Clermont of Cornell Law School and Lea
Brilmayer of New York University Law School for providing extensive and helpful com-
ments on drafts of this Note. I also wish to thank the editors and associates of Cornell
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